Vietnam Thesis- Part XIII

Here is the conclusion of the series taken from my undergraduate thesis.

No war before or since Vietnam has unleashed such doubt about the U.S. government. The soldiers who fought were given what was thought to be every advantage available, but that turned out to be wrong. For America, Vietnam was a pivotal juncture in the Cold War, but for the Vietnamese it was just another war in series of attempts to gain independence. The United States had forgotten its own roots when it entered Vietnam in force in 1965. “This time we were the Redcoats and the Viet Cong were the Minutemen,”said William Bentley of the war; “Not a reversal of roles we should ever emulate again.”  The consequences of that role reversal became clear as the troops came home and enlightened the civilians. 

Ideals had trumped military might, and the men in charge could not see why; the soldiers could, however. The only real victory that can be agreed upon by everyone who lived through Vietnam is that prisoners of war were set free from the clutches of the North Vietnamese. Other than that one thing, the peace in Vietnam was not “with honor” as Nixon had promised.

The South Vietnamese were able to hold out for two years, and then in April 1975 Saigon fell to the communists. It was the final insulting chapter of the war, as the South Vietnamese finally collapsed without the aid they had come to depend on from the United States. Of the horrific end of the war CIA, agent Thomas Pulgar said, “It’s like a goddam circus parade gone haywire! The elephants have moved out in front and everybody else is stumbling through their shit.” The vivid imagery in that quote defines how absolutely awful the Vietnam war was handled by the government. Even someone like Pulgar who had ties to the government saw that the handling of the war was a complete fiasco by the end. Very few elements had gone the Americans’ way, and the fall of Saigon was just one last mishap. 

The images that the war evoked in people’s minds were so horrific and damaging that criticism and analysis became indicative of a nation trying to make sense of a wasted effort. The soldiers felt that their work had been for naught, but just trying to do what was asked of them, even though it was not the best course of action, should have been enough to absolve them. The United States should not have gone to war in Vietnam without more planning or better strategy, or they should not have gone at all. 

Richard Barnet concluded about Vietnam that, “The United States cannot make the world safe for America by seeking to shape the political and economic development of other countries...for the attempt will exhaust both our treasure and our spirit.” Vietnam did exhaust the American spirit, and cost many young vital spirits in the process. The soldiers knew that nothing could win them the war, and nobody listened. Hopefully, that will change as we work to free another nation from tyranny and attempt to fight ideals instead of people.

Vietnam Thesis- Part XII

Part twelve in the ongoing series.

To respond to the Easter attacks, President Nixon resumed bombing of North Vietnam in April. In doing so, Nixon made a statement that the U.S. would not fold in the peace talks by being bullied. In July peace talks resumed with the Northern government, and by October Nixon’s top advisor, Henry Kissenger, stated, “Peace is at hand.” While this statement ended up being true, and with fewer American troops in Vietnam every day, the end of the war came for the fighting men, it would, however, not be as easy as signing a treaty. The bombings continued throughout the fall and winter of 1972, after Nixon won re-election in November. In January 1973, the peace talks came to a close, with the U.S. agreeing to pull completely out of Vietnam, knowing that their ally would eventually fall to the North.

The U.S. government did not have to admit defeat in the war because of the nature of the agreement, but defeat was obvious among those who had served in Vietnam. As Charles E. Neu put it, “The war had seared the consciousness of an entire generation, and altered the mood of the nation.” For those who made it home after the active American part of the war was over, life was very different than before. All the sacrifices that the soldiers had made went unappreciated and many resented them because of the reminder they gave of America’s first military loss. Future Senator John Kerry said of his homecoming, “You begin to see a lot of instant insanity and brutality that I don’t think anybody prepared you for, and then one day...you land back in the United States of America. And nobody cares and nobody wants you to be in uniform.” It is sad to think that the men who had done all they were asked to do got little to no recognition for their efforts. 

The “warriors were blamed for the war,” as well as the government who made them fight, but it was not fair to lump those two groups together when assigning blame. Even after a majority of the men came home, the war was still being misunderstood by the government and the public who could not grasp the realities of what Vietnam was like. “The people who had been my closest friends really knew nothing about Vietnam,” said Marine James Hebron, “They were only interested in what the war was like in terms of their preconceptions of what war was about.” The only viable option was for the men who had fought was to educate the world about how wrong the Vietnam war was, and how unprepared the U.S.A. was to fight it. 

Vietnam was not like World War II; it did not have a clear objective or an obvious enemy. In many ways the veterans became the enemy to the nation as they tried to make sense of the mess that Vietnam had made of the country.

Vietnam Thesis- Part XI

Map of the Easter Offensive

Part eleven, kids.

Amid waning morale and skepticism from soldiers, the first major test of the South Vietnamese army came in early 1971 with an invasion of Laos. The U.S. armed forces were relegated to protecting the ARVN from the Vietnamese side of the border. The offensive known as Lam Son 719, was a complete disaster for the South Vietnamese. After 46 days in February and March, it was clear that the South Vietnamese could not sustain another attack of that sort. Young South Vietnamese people struck back at the Americans, angry that they were now turning their backs on them. U.S. commanders, worried about attacks from Vietnamese civilians and the lack of motivation among their own troops, saw the need to end the war, no matter what. 

This idea of abandonment had long been entertained by the regular GIs, but now it was beginning to sound like an option to the commanders as well. It was evident in that Nixon’s approval rating was sliding as was opinion on his handling of the war. Everyone involved smelled the stench of death on the South Vietnamese, and saw that there was no way to persuade the American troops to continue to die in large numbers. Knowing that very little could be done to secure victory, the Nixon government went to work in 1972 hoping to at least secure peace. Apparently, the complaints of soldiers had finally reached the ears of the men in power. 

In an attempt to move the peace process forward, Nixon unveiled an eight point plan in January of 1972. In response to Nixon’s new plan, the North Vietnamese launched an all out attack on the ARVN and remaining U.S. forces in March. This was done to help give the North an upper hand in the peace process, and to pressure Nixon who was facing the presidential election in November. As with the Tet Offensive before it, the Easter Offensive caught military leaders by surprise. It is not surprising, however, that this lack of information about the attack made troops angry at their superiors. W.R. Baker, who was stationed in Da Nang during 1971 and 1972, wrote that, “The "intelligence failure" during the Easter Offensive was less a failure to collect intelligence than it was a failure to exploit obvious indicators.”

Every slight advantage that the U.S. had during the Vietnam war had been systematically taken away by the enemy, either through their cunning or our inability to take away their edge. After the Spring of 1972 you would be hard pressed to find any man in Vietnam who still fully supported the war.

Vietnam Thesis- Part X

Part ten in my ongoing series on Vietnam.

ARVN forces were now baring the brunt of the casualties and action, including the operations in Cambodia. The incursion into Cambodia was labeled a success, with the U.S. and ARVN troops destroying V.C. supply lines and necessary materials. Also, it allowed the Americans to be replaced with ARVN soldiers along the border, now that the threat had been effectively neutralized. The success of the operation in Cambodia did come with a price, as protests in the United States led to deaths at Kent State where National Guard soldiers shot four students, and at Jackson State College where two people died. Some soldiers also were not happy about the short-lived escalation of the conflict, and saw the increasing ARVN deaths as a bad omen that the NVA and Viet Cong would have their way with them as soon as the U.S. had gone home.

The GIs had stopped caring as a result of Vietnamization to a certain degree. They knew that the Vietnamese could not survive without their help, but the way the war had played out so far made many unable to sympathize. William Kalwas wrote in late 1970, “I begin to realize the futility of it all...so I participate as little as possible in all things army.” This growing apathy among U.S. soldiers during 1970 can be evidenced not only in comments like these, but in the rampant drug use in the American ranks. To dull the pain and disillusionment felt about the way the war was going, many men turned to illegal substances. 

In 1965 47 soldiers were found using drugs, and by 1970 the number had ballooned to 11,000. Of every one soldier caught using drugs it was said at the time by military intelligence that five others went undetected by the armed forces. U.S. soldier Fred Hickey said, “The majority of people were high all the time.” If a war were going well, would so many soldiers be turning to drugs? No, said the statistics of the time, as not only marijuana was available to GIs, but heroin and opium as well, with one third of the men stationed there thought to be addicted to heroin or opium. It is impossible to ignore facts like these when examining the Vietnam War. The U.S. government, while aware of these issues did not take them into account when asking men to die for their country. Drug abuse was symptomatic of things not going well, and in order to escape the harsh reality of war and of failure U.S. troops sank into a haze of smoke and altered perceptions.

Drug abuse was not the only thing affecting the performance of soldiers in Vietnam. Discipline had been on the decline ever since the initiation of Nixon’s withdrawal policy. Senior officers were increasingly met with opposition from their men, and in some cases it amounted to violence. “Fragging” became commonplace, as men killed or attempted to kill their commanders in the field. In 1970 alone, there were 2,000 fraggings. This violence and refusal to obey orders shows that the soldiers had no will to die for the cause, and saw the U.S. leadership as greatly flawed. Men were not ashamed of standing up against a superior if it meant saving lives rather than going to almost certain death, “The captain said ‘I told you to get your squad together and get out there...I just pulled out my .45 and pointed it to his head. I said, ‘Before I go out, sir, I will blow your...brains out.” These types of stories are haunting, and paint a grim picture of the chain of command in Vietnam of the 1970’s.

Vietnam Thesis- Part IX

Lon Nol

That's part nine for those of you that struggle with Roman numerals.

If 1969 had seemed like a step in the wrong direction to the soldiers in Vietnam, 1970 was going to see the consequences of that step. Bringing units home under Nixon’s policy was good for those men, and bad for the army in general. The draft and the fixed tours of duty men served impacted the war in a negative way. Being forced to serve only one year, if the soldier lived, was nice on an individual basis. However, the light at the end of the tunnel for draftees was the end of their tour, not the end of the war. By fixing the tours of duty to one year, there was no motivation for men to fight the war to win; it was to fight the war in order to stay alive. The enemy, on the other hand, was in the war for however long it took.

Unlike the North Vietnamese, the U.S. soldiers were not all volunteers, and this coupled with a lack of solidarity in the military as a result of one year tours made U.S. victory uncertain for the first time in the nation’s history. Conflict over service was rampant in the U.S. like never before, “I couldn’t make up my mind. I feared the war, yes, but I also feared exile...I feared ridicule and censure.” Even though this quote is from a novel, Patrick O’Brien perfectly captures the dilemma of so many men who could not, and yet still did fight in Vietnam. The U.S. government did not understand this dilemma, and pressed on as if it did not exist. The price of ignorance would prove to be high, and success would not come, even with the promise of a new opportunity.

With a change of power in Cambodia in March of 1970 came a chance for Nixon and the war effort to make real strides toward victory. The new leader, Lon Nol, was more supportive of the U.S., and that allowed for a U.S. and ARVN “incursion” into a country which had been harboring Viet Cong soldiers and spies throughout the war. Having not been allowed over the border into Cambodia, the U.S. military’s hands were tied in pursuing much of the enemy force. Nixon had now given his men the opportunity to chase the Viet Cong into its hiding place and eliminate them. By doing so, many men saw a chance to take care of the enemy once and for all and win the war.

The war was being widened temporarily in order to shorten the length of American involvement. In a letter to his hometown paper, Gregory Lusco wrote, “We cheered Nixon when he sent troops to Cambodia- we are praying we’ll also see Laos.” Lusco, like many other men were happy finally to be allowed to fight in Cambodia, but like other operations deemed successes by the U.S. the Viet Cong received advanced warning about the U.S. offensive, and moved into Western Cambodia. At each turn the enemy always seemed to catch a small break.

Vietnam Thesis- Part VIII

The men in Vietnam in 1969 saw first hand how overmatched the ARVN was, and how there was no way for them to stave off the North without U.S. support. Lieutenant William Bentley knew, like many of his fellow soldiers, that for the war to be deemed a success the South would have to win out, and it could not do it with fewer American troops. “The government was fully perpetuating the lie of the righteousness of our cause, our imminent victory...Anyone who had a brain could see that the politicians’ pacification plan wasn't working and that once we left, the South Viets would be "duck soup" against the VC and NVA.” These remarks, show that the soldiers saw the Nixon plan as deeply flawed, and while most were preoccupied with staying alive, they knew how it looked good on the outside, but that it was really just done with smoke and mirrors. The basis for Vietnamization was to provide the Vietnamese with the know how and equipment to fight the war without a major U.S. presence. 

Nixon’s actions painted a rosy picture that the war might be over soon but according to Lt. Bentley it was not as it seemed, “How many times did we have to take the same ground and then give it back so it would look good on the pacification maps and then have to go in and take it back again? Troops will fight all day and all night if they can see the light at the end of the tunnel. If they can't see that light, morale suffers greatly and the troops feel betrayed.” Betrayal became a regular emotion among troops as the war dragged on.

Statistically, Nixon’s plan looked good, and the American people at home became convinced that the war was not far from over. Joseph Morrissey, a Staff Sergeant wrote, “I think the 70’s will see a lot of things changed for the better.” Other soldiers were not as sure, writing home to tell their families the truth about the flawed Vietnamization policy. Marine Archie Biggers wrote of his reality, “The people in Washington setting policy didn’t know what transpired over there.” The new initiatives were turning out more disillusionment than before. Even though, “The average soldier (with the American army) is too busy trying to stay alive to get into opinions,” Lt. Bentley said of the soldiers’ thoughts on Nixon’s policies, “we knew the war strategy was deeply flawed.” Knowing what they knew, soldiers still continued to do their duty for the government, even though that government was oblivious to the reality of life as a soldier in Vietnam.

Vietnam Thesis- Part VII

Part seven in my continuing series on Vietnam.

Many at home and in Vietnam had been holding out hope that the war would suddenly go in America’s favor, and that the North Vietnamese would give up. No one knew for sure until Tet that the enemy was never going to throw in the towel. “The enemy had too much strength and will to be defeated in the South.” This idea crystallized in the weeks after the Tet Offensive, and even with Johnson’s administration on the way out, the soldiers saw no way to secure victory without even greater costs. The need to survive in Vietnam now trumped the need for victory. “I think perhaps this experience is changing me...not as I expected. I have not found much opportunity to help the people...It’s now a war of survival.” This appraisal of the nature of war in 1968 by Sergeant Doug McCormac is not as optimistic as earlier soldiers’ letters home. The thought of not being able to succeed in the ways that Americans had in other wars made many men like McCormac skeptical of the reasons the U.S. had for staying in Vietnam. Leadership in the government and high levels of the military became more and more suspect every day.

An anger began to build during this period in 1968 as soldiers continually saw the ineffectiveness of their superior officers, and were constantly in harms way. The My Lai Massacre is a perfect example of how bad things got for men in the field, and no one in the government really knew what was happening to the men under their command. After Tet, on March 16, 1968 Charlie Company, led by platoon leader Lt. William Calley, attacked a village in the My Lai area, where there was believed to be a stronghold of Viet Cong soldiers and agents. The village was completely destroyed and 400 civilians, women, children and elderly people were brutally killed. Of the attack, Kenneth Hodges said, “This was the time for us to get even. A time for us to settle the score.” 

While it was arguably one of the biggest disasters in the entire war, the My Lai Massacre illustrates a strong point. The mental strain on all the soldier fighting in Vietnam was much greater than anyone at the time thought, and nothing was done about it. Had some of these things been brought to light earlier this dark episode might have been avoided and Calley could have been spared the dishonor that the incident brought him. Unfortunately, My Lai would not be the end of the carnage.

Life at home was becoming increasingly turbulent as well, with more protests of the war and of the government. The draft was creating a good deal of the friction, forcing young men to either go to war, jail or Canada. With Richard Nixon’s win in the 1968 election, there was a feeling that maybe some of the wrongs that had occurred earlier in the year could be rectified, including a failed peace talk in mid-1968. Nixon said at the start of his term, “I will not be the first president of the United States to lose a war.” Unlike Johnson, who had been more focused on domestic issues, Nixon set his sights on foreign policy. 

This new policy, known as Vietnamization, was to be the cornerstone of Nixon’s approach in Vietnam. The idea was to gradually turn the war over to the South Vietnamese, and slowly bring troops home. Soldiers did not see the advantages to this new plan. “This gradual withdrawal is going to cause more damage than good. As there become less and less GIs over here, it means that the guys still here will have to depend more on the ARVNs (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). I would not want to have to depend on an ARVN for anything.” wrote George Ewing in the summer of 1969. This attitude permeated the U.S. ranks in the first months of Nixon’s withdrawal plan. To those not in the know, the withdrawal of troops seemed like the war was going better, and that it might be coming to an end. For GIs still having to stay and fight, the plan for turning the war over to the South Vietnamese as the U.S. pulled out was not a viable option.

Vietnam Thesis- Part VI

Here is part six in my ongoing series.

The Tet Offensive was the major turning point in the war. Not only did the attacks themselves catch the Americans off guard, but also the way in which the North Vietnamese carried out those attacks. Army soldier Donald Hines took note of the brutality of the enemy warfare during and after Tet, “Before the Tet Offensive they would sneak around at nighttime. Now they were saying ‘We’re bad and we’re gonna kick your ass.’” It was clear to many men like Hines that the enemy was now playing for keeps. 

This change in intensity made a large impact on the morale of soldiers, and made many for the first time really question the government’s handling of the war and the tactics used to fight it. Following Tet, Marine Scout Adolphus Stuart “saw that it [America’s plan] wasn’t going to work,” and asked himself “What’s going on?” Tet created many questions about the effectiveness of the American policies and tactics in the fighting of the war. The ones asking the questions were the soldiers who had seen the carnage of Tet close up, and the American public who had smelled failure coming back in 1967. In the first two weeks alone 1,113 U.S. troops died with many calling for the South Vietnamese to do more of the fighting. The huge losses in the major battle centers of South Vietnam proved that the enemy, while depleted, was not going to give up.

As a result of the huge miscalculation made by the U.S. government involving the Tet Offensive, President Johnson committed himself to move towards a peace agreement with the North. In a speech on March 31, 1968, Johnson said, “The United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end.” From these words is was clear to America, now more than ever, that the war in Vietnam was not going according to plan. Johnson reaffirmed this notion at the end of his speech when he said that he would not run for president in the upcoming election. By deciding not to run for re-election, Johnson could focus his time on getting the U.S. out of Vietnam. Soldiers reacted to this move toward peace and the aftermath of Tet very strongly. The president, apart from stopping bombing campaigns and troop movements, planned to turn more of the fighting over to the South Vietnamese while still maintaining supremacy.

Many soldiers who were in Vietnam at the time saw that as wishful thinking, and knew that if the U.S. had barely stood up to the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong at Tet, how could the South Vietnamese do it alone? Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford summed up the dilemma facing the U.S. after Tet saying, “What was the plan to win the war? Well, the only plan was that attrition would wear out the communists, and they would have had enough. Was there any indication that we’ve reached that point? No, there wasn’t.” By the late Spring of 1968 feelings like Clifford’s were being felt throughout Vietnam by soldiers and officials.

Vietnam Thesis- Part V

Here is part five of my ongoing series on the Vietnam War.

As missions intensified and more men came home in flag draped coffins, the U.S. Government continued to support its troops and the war as protests against the war became more prevalent. Many times it was the troops themselves who reassured the public about the reasons for the war, and even with the horrors of Vietnam mounting, they still were able to see the silver lining. As Lieutenant Marion Lee Kempner put it, “We were given no choice and we must fight where the confrontation is, despite its cost, infeasibility, and possible illegality and physical and mental toll upon the participants...” Just as so many others had said in similar ways, Kempner saw just cause for the war not because he wanted to, but because he had to in order to give his military service meaning. Unfortunately, Kempner died in Vietnam, for a war he did not wish for, but fought anyway. 

The attitude of doing a job that was potentially meaningless and very harmful, merely out of obligation, is the way a great many soldiers fought the Vietnam War up to and including 1967. Most of the letters from soldiers, and their reflections after the war illustrate that while Vietnam was not the right war for America, it nevertheless had to be fought, despite all the signs that it was not going exactly as planned by the government.

By the end of 1967, it was clear to President Johnson and his staff that General Westmoreland’s new strategy of offensive campaigns were relatively successful, despite costing 15,000 American lives in 1967 alone. The enemy, however, had lost considerably more. In a bloody battle at Dak To in November, 287 American soldiers were killed, but the U.S. military deemed it a victory. Victories like the one at Dak To were becoming routine, and in this war of attrition the U.S. appeared to be winning. What the U.S. did not realize was that battles like Dak To were strengthening the enemy’s resolve, and weakening the determination of their own men. 

Whether this was known to Westmoreland, he did not show it, and said of 1967, “I have never been more encouraged in my four years in Vietnam...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.” 1968 would blur the end from the American view, granting new life to the enemy, and the anti-war movement.

A feeling of foreboding began to creep into the American psyche in January of 1968 as word of a North Vietnamese buildup at Khe Sanh came to General Westmoreland’s attention. Northern troops were creating a stronghold in the Northern part of South Vietnam, presumably to mount a large offensive against U.S. forces. Westmoreland became convinced that during the impending North Vietnamese offensive, Khe Sanh would need to be a primary target for the Americans. Unfortunately for Westmoreland and the Americans, the build up at Khe Sanh was a diversion created by the Viet Cong to draw U.S. troops away from the cities and other areas in the South.

This elaborate ruse on the part of the North Vietnamese would haunt the rest of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. The plan was for Viet Cong agents and North Vietnamese soldiers to infiltrate major Southern cities and attack without warning while the major part of the U.S. force was busy surrounding the base at Khe Sanh. The attack came during the Vietnamese holiday of Tet on January 31st. The complete and utter surprise that the Tet Offensive had on American troops once again showed the soldiers and government how unprepared they were to fight this war, and how little they understood their enemy. The attack on the American Embassy in Saigon was not ultimately seen as a North Vietnamese victory, but the destruction of the outer part of the building left a lasting impression on U.S. soldiers who saw that nothing was safe from attack.

Vietnam Thesis- Part IV

Here is part four in my series about the Vietnam War.

Despite the inability to make major gains in the war, 1966 saw no real dip in support of the war even as the body count grew. By early 1967, 400,000 men were stationed in Vietnam with the flow of soldiers and equipment continuing to grow. General Westmoreland’s tactics changed in 1967 in order to give everyone the victory that America sought. Instead of using limited operations and South Vietnamese troops, Westmoreland began his “Search and Destroy” policy which involved major offensives by U.S. troops. 

The change in method altered the course of the war, and began a downhill slide for the U.S. military. Public support and troop morale would never again be the same. Letters home reflected the change in America’s views on Vietnam. “The spirit of the men in Vietnam is overwhelming, for most every man believes he is doing an important job...they are your countrymen, and, believe it or not they have been fighting for you.” Rodney Baldra of 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry wrote this to his hometown newspaper in Berkeley, California, hoping to rally public support for what he was fighting for. His sentiments reflect the growing public skepticism that men in Vietnam began to get wind of in 1967. Public opinion was growing less supportive of the war, and many soldiers like Baldra saw that as a slap in the face. The reasons for fighting in Vietnam seemed very plain to some, and unclear to others. The latter group continued to grow as 1967 wore on.

Many soldiers stationed in Vietnam in 1967 viewed themselves as better than the Viet Cong forces, and this attitude got them through tough times. As Captain Robert F. Radcliffe observed in 1967, the men were, “Armed...with the knowledge that they were members of the most powerful and best prepared army in the world, they were psychologically prepared to meet the enemy.” Radcliffe and men like him saw the U.S. Army’s will and power as greater than the enemy, and that there was no logical reason a small band of communists could defeat them.

While that line of thinking was not theoretically incorrect, the war in Vietnam made the U.S. begin to doubt its military might for the first time. Simply adding troops and equipment to the battle did not guarantee victory as in previous wars. In his final letter home PFC Stephen Pickett talks about the beginnings of anti-war sentiment back in the U.S. “We were well informed here about the demonstrations on both sides...I realize...that an immediate pullout is out of the question...it would mean going back on everything that we have done.”  Like Radcliffe, Pickett saw while he was in Vietnam in 1967 that too many men had died to just give up, and that the U.S. was still doing the right thing, even if not everyone understood that. By doing the right thing Pickett lost his life in December of 1967 on a Search and Destroy mission.

Vietnam Thesis- Part III

Here is Part III of my paper on the Vietnam War.

It was not known at the beginning of the war how little the U.S. government and military knew about their enemy and how best to fight them. The North Vietnamese military and the Viet Cong knew the territory and had developed a way to fight that gave them an advantage over their enemy. Ambushes were the nature of battle in the Vietnam War, and in some ways the Americans did not expect that type of warfare. “It was coming from everywhere, the ground the trees. Suddenly, everyone around me was getting hit and dying...We fought and fought for what seemed hours, but it was no good.” This description of battle at Ia Drang in October 1965 by Sergeant Miguel Seise illustrates that the U.S. military was not prepared to face an enemy like the one they encountered in Vietnam. 

Even though the Americans were victorious at Ia Drang they suffered 247 deaths and 570 wounded. Battles like the one at Ia Drang would soon become more commonplace as 1965 turned into 1966 with more men dying. In June, 1966 the war was already showing signs of turning against the Americans. Kenneth Peeples wrote of a horrific battle, “I can’t help crying now because I think about the horror...In my squad of nine men, only four of us survived.” Horrors like those experienced by Peeples were about to become much more common as the U.S. commitment intensified. By 1966 an average of 400 men were killed each month in Vietnam. The battles in which these soldiers died were usually without a clear victor, and with a new objective by the enemy, killing as many U.S. soldiers as possible.

As time went on, U.S. soldiers realized that they were fighting a war on the Viet Cong’s terms, without a clear plan to gain the upper hand. A small factor contributing to the V.C. advantage was guns and ammunition. Shortly after the U.S. arrived in Vietnam, the U.S. Army switched the standard rifle from the heavy, reliable M-14 to the less reliable, plastic M-16. The Viet Cong, however, packed the highly effective Russian AK-47 which could utilize both Russian and U.S. ammunition. Rifleman Frank McCarthy called the M-16 a “Mattel Toy.” According to McCarthy and others in his unit (101st Airborne) the war in 1965 and 1966 was meant to last only a year or possibly two, but after a few months in Vietnam he noticed a lack of action by the U.S. military heads which lead to an inactive American force who were “immobile.”

One of the elements that gave the Americans a mobile advantage quickly turned against them in 1966. By using helicopters for support, a U.S. unit that was pinned down by enemy fire could call in and have the helicopters bring reinforcements. Beginning in early 1966, the Viet Cong took advantage of the predictable U.S. pattern of calling in for reinforcements by waiting and ambushing the helicopters. Army correspondent Frank Faulkner noticed how these attacks on helicopters shook American soldiers, and sent morale shooting downward. By using their advantage against them, the Viet Cong continued to make the U.S. fight their war, their way.

Vietnam Thesis- Part II

Here now is part two of my Undergrad thesis on the Vietnam War.

As with any war there will always be a contingent of men, however large or small that will fight any place, anytime for their country. The Vietnam War began just like all of the American wars that came before. Gung-ho young men went to do their American duty by serving as soldiers to defend their nation. Following the overwhelming American success in World War II, many young men went to Vietnam with a rosy outlook and deeply romantic feelings about the nature of war. “Dear Mom and Dad, Everything here is just fine- in fact it’s better than I thought it would be...All the talk I hear from the guys who have been here awhile make it sound pretty easy over here." This excerpt from a letter written by PFC John Debonka illustrates the innocence of the soldiers who came to Vietnam early on in the war. Debonka arrived in Vietnam in late 1966, and was killed in February of 1967. It was not as easy as he or many Americans thought at the time.

The reasons that the American people were given made those who served more eager than they might have been. President Lyndon Johnson’s original reasons for sending in ground troops in the Spring of 1965 was to protect U.S. military installations, not to attack the Vietnamese directly. The entire operation in Vietnam stemmed from the fear of communism, and by June it had become clear that the army was not solely there to defend, as reports came out about offensive moves by U.S. troops.

The public was not overly concerned, but the horrors of the war could not escape the young men, who, while patriotic, were not ready for what they experienced. As escalation occurred throughout 1965, Johnson and his advisors attempted to maintain popular support, and get young men involved in the cause. Student leaders were brought to Washington D.C. for seminars, and young soldiers toured college campuses in a project known as “Target: College Campuses.” Initiatives like these were effective, but Johnson had already committed 100,000 more troops to the cause in Vietnam by the end of 1965 at the request of General William Westmoreland and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The stage for long-term involvement in Vietnam had been set, and the men that were to fight had to deal with the consequences of their Government’s actions.

There was a sense of duty for many of the soldiers, who, while still uneasy about the war, felt compelled to stop the spread of communism. PFC Richard Marks wrote in a letter home in December 1965 that “I don’t like being over here, but I am doing a job that must be done- I am fighting an inevitable enemy that must be fought- now or later.” This attitude reflects the patriotism that many felt, while still being uncertain as to whether or not Vietnam was the right war at the right time. A commonality among many of the soldiers was a feeling that if communism in Vietnam was not stopped here and now, then the threat might move closer to home. The idea was to head off communism before the Russians and their client states could gain a legitimate foothold on territory, and we should help keep those countries free.

The idea of “helping” the Vietnamese to evade communism was central to the motus operandi of the war. Lt. Thomas Bird talks about helping, and how the military had no real clue about how to treat the Vietnamese people. This is only one aspect of how under prepared the U.S. military was to fight this war, and how the soldiers who were there had no chance of beating their enemy.“We had a strong indoctrination in “help”...We all had a tremendous big brother ego, everybody gave the kids something to eat.” David Parks wrote in his journal in March of 1967, “I’m not sure the native people are with us. They smile at us in the daytime, and their sons shoot us at night. It’s hard to spot the real enemy.” Life for G.I.s was difficult because of this, and the government was not equipped to prepare them for it.

Vietnam Thesis- Part I

For my undergraduate thesis I wrote a lengthy paper about the Vietnam War, specifically, what soldiers felt about the war as they were fighting it. I will serialize this thesis on my blog in an attempt to shed some light on what I feel is an important topic. Here now is part one.

Ever since the United States was formed in the late 18th Century, there have been wars that this nation has had to fight, some internal and some external. In the 20th Century the nature of war changed, and it became more deadly and costly than ever before. The two World Wars altered the course of history, with the United States emerging as the largest of the world’s powers. Following the end of World War II, the U.S. took on the role of peacekeeper and watchdog for the world, and had only one challenger for supremacy, the communist Soviet Union. Communism, and everything that the Soviets stood for was contrary to the American ideals of freedom and democracy, but unlike the Nazis whose ideology was rooted in Germany, communism was not limited to Russia. 

The fact that many nations succumbed to communism following World War II (China in 1949, Cuba in 1958 and the North Koreans in the 1940’s) showed the U.S. that there was not one enemy to fight, but many. While most in the U.S. during the early Cold War believed the international communist conspiracy came directly from the Kremlin, an all out war with the U.S.S.R. was not an option. Vietnam, therefore, became the American battlefield against communism, and the supposed beginning of the end for the Russians. 

It was, however, not that simple, and in 1965 U.S. troops began fighting a war that they could not win, in spite of efforts made by the government earlier. Did these men who volunteered or that were drafted know that they were fighting an unwinnable war? Were they aware that this war was different from the ones their fathers and older brothers had fought in before? Did they know that no matter how many times we beat the Viet Cong in battle that the enemy would never give up? In these blog entries, the feelings of the everyday soldier will be explored to figure out what they felt and knew as they fought against an ideology as opposed to a more conventional enemy. 

Said U.S. Army Officer John K. Walker, “This isn’t a war for territory, it’s a war for the hearts and minds of the people.”